Wednesday, December 11, 2013

Continuing Facebook "Who's Viewed Your Profile" Campaign Affects Another 190k+ Users, Exposes Malicious Cybercrime Ecosystem


Last week, immediately after I published the initial analysis detailing a massive privacy-violating "Who's Viewed Your Profile" campaign, that was circulating across Facebook, the cybercriminals behind it, supposedly took it offline, with one of the main redirectors now pointing to 127.0.0.1.

Not surprisingly, the primary campaign has multiple sub-campaigns still in circulation, which based on the latest statistics -- embedded within the campaign on the same day they supposedly shut it down -- has already exposed another 190,000+ of the social network's users -- the original campaign appears to have been launched in 2011 having already exposed 800,000+ users -- to more rogue, privacy violating apps -- JS.Febipos, Mindspark Interactive Network's MyImageConverter and Trojan-Ransomer.CLE, in this particular case.

Let's dissect the still circulating campaign, expose the entire infrastructure supporting it, establish direct connections with it to related malicious campaigns, indicating that someone's either multi-tasking, or that their malicious/fraudulent activities share the same infrastructure, provide MD5s for the currently served privacy-violating apps, as well as list the actual -- currently live -- hosting locations.


Sample redirection chain:
hxxp://NXJXBMQ.tk/?12358289 - 93.170.52.21; 93.170.52.33 -> hxxp://p2r0f3rviewer9890.co.nf/?sdk222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222ajsklfjasl
fkjasfklja -> hxxp://prostats.vf1.us - 192.157.201.42 -> hxxp://whoviewsfb.uni.me/ch/profile.html - 82.208.40.11

Redirection chain domain name reconnaissance:
NXJXBMQ.tk - 93.170.52.21; 93.170.52.33
p2r0f3rviewer9890.co.nf - 83.125.22.192
whoviewsfb.uni.me - 82.208.40.11
prostats.vf1.us - 192.157.201.42
wh0stalks.uni.me - 192.157.201.42
cracks4free.info - 192.157.201.42

Known to have responded to 93.170.52.21 are also the following fraudulent domains:
0.facebook.com.fpama.tk
001200133184123129811.tk
00wwebhost.tk
01203313441.tk
01prof86841.tk
029m821t9fs.4ieiii.tk
031601.tk
0333.tk
0571baidu.tk
05pr0f1le21200.tk
05pr0file214741.tk
060uty80w.tk
06emu.tk
0886.tk
0akleycityn.tk
0ao0grecu.tk
0fcf7.chantaljltaste.tk
0lod1lmt1.tk
0love.tk

The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 93.170.52.21 in the past:
MD5: ee78fe57ad8dbac96b31f41f77eb5877
MD5: bed006372fc76ec261dc9b223b178438
MD5: 58f9cbec80d1dc3a5afbb7339d200e66
MD5: fd0c6b284f7700d59199c55fdcd5bd8a
MD5: 4bfeb3c882d816d37c3e6cbb749e44af
MD5: 97ec866ac26e961976e050591f49fec3
MD5: aba1720b1a6747de5d5345b5893ba2f5
MD5: de5e1f6f137ecb903a018976fc04e110
MD5: a9669b65cabd6b25a32352ccf6c6c09a
MD5: 003f4d9dafba9ee6e358b97b8026e354
MD5: bab313e031b0c54d50fd82d221f7defc
MD5: e6b766f627b91fd420bd93fab4bc323f
MD5: d63656d9b051bf762203b0c4ac728231
MD5: 935440d970ee5a6640418574f4569dab
MD5: 2524e3b4ed3663f5650563c1e431b05c
MD5: f726646a41f95b12ec26cf01f1c89cf9
MD5: a5af6c04d28fcea476827437caf4c681
MD5: c7346327f86298fa5dad160366a0cf26
MD5: 912ed9ef063ae5b6b860fd34f3e8b83a
MD5: b33aaa98ad706ced23d7c64aed0fcad6

Known to have responded to 93.170.52.33 are also the following fraudulent domains:
0lwwa.tk
0msms.tk
122.72.0.7sierra-web-www.szjlc-pcb.tk
1z8dz.tk
4f1wz8.ga
777898.ga
888234.ml
8eld7.tk
abmomre.tk
accountupdateinformation.tk
ahram-org-eg.tk
alex-fotos.tk
allycam.tk
amerdz.ml
angelsmov.tk
apis-drives-google.tk
apis-googledrive.tk
apple-idss.tk
appleid.apple.com.cgi-bin.myappleid.woa.apple-idss.tk
avtoshina.tk

The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 93.170.52.33 in the past:
MD5: 2d951e649a8bbcbfa468f7916e188f9f
MD5: dbe2c0788e74916eba251194ef783452
MD5: 4bfeb3c882d816d37c3e6cbb749e44af
MD5: dc01c1db51e26b585678701a64c94437
MD5: 61cc3de4e9a9865e0d239759ed3c7d5a
MD5: 64505b7ca1ce3c1c0c4892abe8d86321
MD5: 0b98356395b2463ea0f339572b9c95ef
MD5: 9e87c189d3cbf2fc2414934bef6e661b
MD5: 48964a66bdc81b48f2fe7a31088c041b
MD5: f81c85bea0e2251655b7112b352f302e

The following MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 83.125.22.192 in the past:
MD5: 3935b6efa7e5ee995f410f4ef1e613ab
MD5: 64c1496e1ba2b7cb5c54a33c20be3e95
MD5: 08f76a1ed5996d7dfdcf8226fe3f66b9
MD5: f508d8034223c4ce233f1bdbed265a3a

Known to have responded to 82.208.40.11 are the following fraudulent domains:
000e0062fb44cd5b277591349e070277.cz.cc
003bc1b16c548efbc4f30790e0bc17be.cz.cc
0057ab88a8febe310f94107137731424.cz.cc
008447a58c242b52cb69fe7dceea9a0b.cz.cc
00a47e5e57323f23c66f2c2d5bc1debc.cz.cc
00a9a591d1e7aaf65639781bc73199d4.cz.cc
00ad3353e0ba865a521da380ba4e0cc4.cz.cc
00d55beb792962f7a04c66b85f2c6082.cz.cc
00e3b9ece447187da3f43f98ab619a28.cz.cc
00eb52dbc4331a64e4fd96fdca890d9c.cz.cc
00f59cfa33cd097e943a38a8f2e343ee.cz.cc
00fbdb49398f0e5fd9d5572044d8934e.cz.cc
010ab81241856dfca44dd9ade4489fbc.cz.cc
011622fb7752328ebb60bd2c075f1fe6.cz.cc
011fbf88cff1c18e05c2afb53d6e5ffd.cz.cc
0133147433aeef23bbe60df0cbc4eac9.cz.cc
013f98b7157ae3754d463e9d2346a549.cz.cc
013fa3e9db6e476282b8e9f1bac6d68e.cz.cc
017c2bd33744c2d423a2a7598a0c0a4e.cz.cc
019368b1f3b364c0d3ec412680638f04.cz.cc

The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 82.208.40.11 in the past:
MD5: 2c89dfc1706b31ba7de1c14e229279e5
MD5: 6719d3e8606d91734cde25b8dfc4156f
MD5: 61dcea6fbf15b68be831bff8c5eb0c1d
MD5: 3875fa91f060d02bddd43ff8e0046588
MD5: 929b72813bae47f78125ec30c58f3165
MD5: 96fa2ea6db2e4e9f00605032723e1777
MD5: c46968386138739c81e219da6fb3ead5
MD5: 3d627e0dbc5ac51761fa7cc7b202ec49
MD5: d9714a0f7f881d3643125aa0461a30be
MD5: 81171015a95073748994e463142ddcc7

Known to have responded to 192.157.201.42 are also the following fraudulent domains:
cracks4free.info
pr0lotra.p9.org
prostats.vf1.us
wh0prof.uni.me
cracks4free.info

Time to provide the actual, currently live, hosting locations for the served privacy-violating content.


Mindspark Interactive Network's MyImageConverter served URL:
hxxp://download.myimageconverter.com/index.jhtml?partner=^AZ0^xdm081

Google Store served URLs:
hxxps://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/miapmjacmjonmofofflhnbafpbmfapac - currently active
hxxps://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dllaajjfgpigkeblmlbamflggfjkgbej

Dropbox Accounts serving the Android app (offline due to heavy usage), and the Firefox extension:
hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/rueyn3owrrpsbw4/whoviews5.xpi - currently online
hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/so3vm50w298qkto/WhoViewsYourProfile.apk

Facebook App URL:
hxxp://apps.facebook.com/dislike___button/

Google Docs served privacy-violating apps:
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqVFljUDBnTjFHdVE&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqRXBMLWZ4cVZJV2s&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqOXlyNko0VFBOdnM&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqZm5yeUFudFhqclU&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqbWpfNW5FalJmRGM&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqS3V1ZkZBQjJGbjQ&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqX2xXbEJLbEY0Q3M&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqMU5RVkJSWURxME0&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqVFljUDBnTjFHdVE&export=download

GA Account IDs: UA-23441223-3; UA-12798017-1
MyImageConverter Affiliate Network ID: ^AZ0^xdm081

Detection rate for the served apps/extensions:
MD5: 30cf98d7dc97cae57f8d72487966d20b - detected by 19 out of 49 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransomer.CLE; Troj/Mdrop-FNZ
MD5: 88dd376527c18639d3f8bf23f77b480e - detected by 8 out of 49 antivirus scanners as JS:Febipos-N [Trj]; JS/Febipos

Once executed, MD5: 30cf98d7dc97cae57f8d72487966d20b also drops MD5: 106320fc1282421f8f6cf5eb0206abee and MD5: 43b20dc1b437e0e3af5ae7b9965e0392 on the affected hosts. It then phones back to 195.167.11.4:

Two more MD5s from different malware campaigns, are known to have phoned back to 195.167.11.4:
MD5: 8192c574b8e96605438753c49510cd97
MD5: d55de5e9ec25a80ddfecfb34d417b098


The Privacy Policy (hxxp://prostats.vf1.us/firefox/pp.html) and the EULA (hxxp://prostats.vf1.us/firefox/eula.html) point to hxxp://dislikeIt.com - 176.74.176.179. Not surprisingly, multiple malicious MD5s are also known to have previously interacted with the same IP:
MD5: d366088e4823829798bd59a4d456a3df
MD5: 3c73db8202d084f33ab32069f40f58c8
MD5: d7fce1ec777c917f72530f79363fc6d3
MD5: 83568d744ab226a0642233b93bfc7de6
MD5: c84b1bd7c2063f34900bbc9712d66e0f
MD5: 58baa919900656dacaf39927bb614cf1
MD5: a86e97246a98206869be78fd451029a0
MD5: 70a0894397ac6f65c64693f1606f1231
MD5: f9166237199133b24cd866b61d0f6cca
MD5: 0f24ad046790ee863fd03d19dbba7ea5


Based on the latest performance metrics for the campaign, over 190,000 users have already interacted with this sub-campaign, since 4th of December, when I initially analyzed the primary campaign.


Monitoring of the campaign is naturally in progress. Updates will be posted as soon as new developments take place.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Wednesday, December 04, 2013

Facebook Circulating 'Who's Viewed Your Profile' Campaign Exposes 800k+ Users to CrossRider PUA/Rogue Firefox Add-ons/Android Adware AirPush

A massive privacy-violating, Facebook circulating "Who's Viewed Your Profile" campaign, has been operating beneath the radar, exposing over 800,000 users internationally, to a cocktail of PUAs (Potentially Unwanted Applications), rogue Firefox Add-ons impersonating Adobe's Flash Player, as well as the Android based adware AirPush.

Relying on a proven social engineering tactic of "offering what's not being offered in general", next to hosting the rogue files on legitimate service providers -- Google Docs and Dropbox in this particular case -- the campaign is a great example that the ubiquitous for the social network social engineering scheme, continues to trick gullible and uninformed users into installing privacy-violating applications on their hosts/mobile devices.

Let's dissect the campaign, expose its infrastructure, (conservatively) assess the damage, and provide fresh MD5s for the currently served privacy-violating PUAs, Firefox add-ons, and Android adware.

Primary spamvertised Facebook URL: FCOSYUC.tk/?15796422
Redirection chain: p2r0f3rviewer9890.co.nf -> bit.ly/1bZCeNv?vsdvc -> wh0prof.uni.me/?sdvsjka -> wh0prof.uni.me/ch/
Rogue Google Store Extension URL (currently offline): hxxps://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dllaajjfgpigkeblmlbamflggfjkgbej
Campaign's GA Account ID: UA-12798017-1


Domain name reconnaissance:
wh0prof.uni.me - 192.157.201.42

Known to have responded to the same IP are also the following domains:
cracks4free.info
pr0lotra.p9.org


Google Docs Hosted PUA URLs:
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqVFljUDBnTjFHdVE&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqRXBMLWZ4cVZJV2s&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqUjllLWc4MVFRQUk&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqOXlyNko0VFBOdnM&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqZm5yeUFudFhqclU&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqbWpfNW5FalJmRGM&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqS3V1ZkZBQjJGbjQ&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqX2xXbEJLbEY0Q3M&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqMU5RVkJSWURxME0&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqVFljUDBnTjFHdVE&export=download


Dropbox Firefox Add-on/Android APK Hosted URLs:
hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/so3vm50w298qkto/WhoViewsYourProfile.apk
hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/kor9c2mqv49esva/kkadobe-ff.xpi



Detection rate for the served PUAs, the Android adware and the rogue Firefox Add-on:
MD5: c7fcf7078597ea752b8d54e406c266a7 - detected by 5 out of 48 antivirus scanners as PUP.Optional.CrossRider
MD5: 30cf98d7dc97cae57f8d72487966d20b - detected by 6 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Trojan.Dropper.FB
MD5: f2459b6bde1d662399a3df725bf8891b - detected by 13 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Adware/AirPush!Android; Android Airpush; Adware/ANDR.Airpush.G.Gen
MD5: 3fb95e1ed77d1b545cf7385b4521b9ae - detected by 18 out of 48 antivirus scanners as JS/TrojanClicker.Agent.NDL

Once executed MD5: 30cf98d7dc97cae57f8d72487966d20b phones back to 195.167.11.4.

Time to (conservatively) assess the campaign's damage over the year(s):





The click-through rate should be considered conservative, and it remains unknown whether the URL shortening service was used by the cybercriminal(s) since day one of the campaign.




The campaign remains active, and is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of similar campaigns tricking Facebook's users into thinking that they can eventually see who's viewed their profile. Facebook users who stumble across such campaigns on their own, or their friends' Walls, are advised to consider reporting the campaign back to Facebook, immediately.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Thursday, November 14, 2013

Fake Chrome/Firefox/Internet Explorer/Safari Updates Expose Users to Android Malware

A currently ongoing malicious campaign using compromised sites as the primary traffic acquisition tactic, is attempting to socially engineer users (English and Russian speaking) into thinking that they're using an outdated version of their browser, and need to apply a bogus (security/antivirus) update. In reality though, the update is a variant of Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.EQ/Android.SmsSend.

Sample screenshots of the fake browser update landing pages:




Social engineering redirection chain: hxxp://france-leasebacks.com/includes/domit/1.php -> hxxp://advertcliks.net/ir/28/1405/56e9ca1335c2773445a79d5ddf75a755/ (93.115.82.239; Email: maxaxaha@gmail.com) -> hxxp://newupdateronline.org (109.163.230.182; Email: vbistrih@yandex.com).

Known to have responded to 109.163.230.182 are also the following domains:
1mc8.asia
anglecultivatep.in
appallinglyndiscoveries.in
bilious-6biros.in
boathire.pw
cvwv87.pro
dlsdcncnew1.pw
efuv77.pro
familye-perspex.in
farting-meagre.in
flvupdate.in
fringeclamberedk.in
hopefully-great8.in
investment-growsa.asia
money-tree.pw
moon-media.pw
moontree.pw
mountainlake.pw
movingv-relation.in
new-updateronline.org

Sample Android samples pushed by the campaign:
MD5: da7fffa08bdeb945ca8237c2894aedd0 - detected by 11 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Android.SmsSend.809.origin; Android.Trojan.FakeInst.HE
MD5: 1e1f57f6c8c9fb39da8965275548174f - detected by 17 out of 46 antivirus scanners as HEUR:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.fe; Andr/RuSms-AL
MD5: b0f597636859b7f5b2c1574d7a8bbbbb - detected by 13 out of 47 antivirus scanners as HEUR:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.fe; Andr/RuSms-AL
MD5: b40aebc327e1bc6aabe5ccb4f18e8ea4 - detected by 16 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Android:FakeIns-AF; Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.EQ

All samples phone back to dlsdcncnew.net (109.163.230.182; Email: constantin.zawyalov@yandex.ru). Responding to the same IP is also newapk-flv.org.

The same email is also known to have been previously used to register the following domains:
downloader8days.in
open-filedownload4.in (known to have responded to 188.95.159.30)
upweight.in
bestnewbrowsers.in
bestowedcomedyb.org (known to have responded to 109.163.230.180)
expandload.in
2012internet-load.in
4interfilefolder.in
99030.in
admitted-6crept.org
rufileserver.in

It appears that the traffic is not segmented -- to affect mobile device users only -- at any point of the redirection chain, an indication of what I believe is a boutique cybercrime-friendly operation. In comparison, the relatively more sophisticated ones would segment the traffic, usually acquired through the active exploitation of tens of thousands of legitimate Web sites, or the direct purchase of segmented mobile traffic.

Interestingly, both novice players in this market segment, and the experienced ones, are implementing basic evasive tactics, such as, for instance, the need to provide a valid mobile number, where a potential victim will receive a confirmation code for accessing the inventory of rogue games and applications, thereby preventing automatic acquisition of the apps for further analysis. Moreover, providing a valid mobile number to the cybercriminals behind the campaign, is naturally prone to be abused in ways largely based on the preferences of those who obtained them through such a way, therefore users are advised not to treat their mobile number in a privacy conscious way.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

New Commercially Available Modular Malware Platform Released On the Underground Marketplace

Cybercriminals have recently released a new (v3 to be more precise indicating possible beneath the radar operation until now), commercially available, modular malware platform, including such cybercrime-friendly features like DNS Changer, Loaders, Injects, and Ransomware features -- completely blocking the Internet access of the affected user in this particular case -- with several upcoming modules such as stealth VNC, and Remote IE (a feature which would allow them to completely hijack any sort of encrypted session taking place on the affected host, naturally including the cookies).

Sample screenshots of the command and control interface+DNS Changer in action:

With prices for the standard package starting from $1,500, I expect that the malware bot will quickly gain market share thanks to its compatibility with existing/working crimeware concepts/releases, as well as thanks to the general availability of 24/7/365 managed malware crypting services, applying the necessary degree of QA (Quality Assurance) to a potential campaign before launching it. Moreover, yet another factor that would greatly contribute to the success of such type of newly released platforms is the the ease of acquisition of legitimate traffic -- think blackhat SEO, compromised FTP accounts, or mass SQL injection campaigns -- to be later on converted into malware-infected hosts, most commonly through social engineering, or the client-side exploitation of outdated and already patched vulnerabilities in browser plugins/third-party applications.

Furthermore, with or without the full scale modularity in place -- some of the modules are currently in the works, as well as the lack of built-in renting/reselling/traffic acquisition/affiliate network type of monetization elements, typical for what can be best described as platform type of underground market release compared to a standalone modular malware bot, the bot's worth keeping an eye on.

The DNS Changer IP seen in the screenshot 62.76.176.214 (62-76-176-214.clodo.ru), can also be connected to related malicious activity. For instance, MD5: cef012fb4fa7cd55f04558ecee04cd4e is known to have previously phoned back to 62.76.176.214.

And most interestingly, according to this assessment, next to phoning back to 62.76.176.214, the following malicious domains are also known to have been used as C&Cs by the same sample:
6r3u8874dfd9.com - known to have responded to 31.170.179.179
r55u87799hd39.com - known to have responded to 31.170.179.179
r95u8114dfd9.com

The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to the same C&C IP (31.170.179.179) since the beginning of the month:
MD5: 56f05611ec91f010d015536b7e9fe1a5
MD5: 49aeaa9fad5649d20a9c56e611e81d96
MD5: bf4fa138741ec4af0a0734b28142f7ae
MD5: cd92df2172a40ebb507fa701dcb14fea
MD5: 1d51cde1ab7a1d3d725e507089d3ba5e
MD5: a00695df0a50b3d3ffeb3454534d97a8
MD5: ea8340c95589ca522dac1e04839a9ab9
MD5: f2933ca59e8453a2b50f6d38a9ad9709
MD5: dd9c4ba82de8dcf0f3e440b302e223e8
MD5: d92ad37168605579319c3dff4d6e8c26
MD5: 004bf3f6b7f49d5c650642dde3255b16
MD5: deb8bcd6c7987ee4e0a95273e76feccd
MD5: 1791cb3e3da28aec11416978f415dcd3
MD5: 7eae6322c9dcaa0f12a99f2c52b70224
MD5: 0027511d25a820bcdc7565257fd61ba4
MD5: 294edcdaab9ce21cb453dc40642f1561
MD5: b414d9f54a723e8599593503fe0de4f1
MD5: 20ee0617e7dc03c571ce7d5c2ee6a0a0
MD5: e1059ae3fb9c62cf3272eb6449de23cf

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

A Peek Inside a Customer-ized API-enabled DIY Online Lab for Generating Multi-OS Mobile Malware


The exponential growth of mobile malware over the last couple of years, can be attributed to a variety of 'growth factors', the majority of which continue playing an inseparable role in the overall success and growth of the cybercrime ecosystem in general.

Tactics like standardization, efficiency-oriented monetization, systematic bypassing of industry accepted/massively adopted security measures like signatures-based antivirus scanning, affiliate networks helping cybercriminals secure revenue streams for their malicious/fraudulent tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), as well as pseudo legal distribution of deceptive software -- think scaware with long EULAs and ToS-es -- as well as mobile applications -- think subscription based premium rate SMS malware with long EULAs and ToS-es -- continue dominating the arsenal of tactics that any cybercriminal aspiring the occupy a market share in any market segment within the cybercrime ecosystem, can easily take advantage of in 2013.

What has changed over the last couple of years, in terms of concepts? A lot. For instance, back in 2007, approximately one year after I (publicly) anticipated the upcoming and inevitable monetization of mobile malware, the Red Browser started making its rounds, proving that I was sadly wrong, and once again, money and greed -- or plain simple profit maximization to others -- would play a crucial role in this emerging back then, cybercrime ecosystem market segment for mobile malware. Similar monetization attempts on behalf of cybercriminals, then followed, to further strengthen the ambitions of cybercriminals into this emerging market segment.

With "malicious economies of scale" just starting to materialize at the time, it didn't take long before the concept started getting embedded into virtually each and every cybercrime-friendly product/service advertised on the market. Thanks to Symbian OS dominating the mobile operating system at the time, opportunistic cybercriminals quickly adapted to steal a piece of the pie, by releasing multiple Symbian based malware variants. Sharing is caring, therefore, here are some MD5s from the Symbian malicious code that used to dominate the threat landscape, back then.

Symbian OS malware MD5s from that period of time, for historical OSINT purposes:
MD5: a4a70d9c3dbe955dd88ea6975dd909d8
MD5: 98f7cfd42df4a01e2c4f2ed6d38c1af1
MD5: 6fd6b68ed3a83b2850fe293c6db8d78d
MD5: 38837c60e2d87991c6c754f8a6fb5c2d
MD5: ace9c6c91847b29aefa0a50d3b54bac5
MD5: 3f1828f58d676d874a3473c1cd01a431
MD5: 2163ef88da9bd31f471087a55f49d1b1
MD5: 0a04f6fed68dec7507d7bf246aa265eb
MD5: ad4a9c68f631d257bd76490029227e41
MD5: 7a4639488b4698f131e42de56ceeb45d
MD5: fa3de591d3a7353080b724a294dca394
MD5: 5ba5fad8923531784cd06a1edc6e0001
MD5: 66abbd9a965b2213f895e297f40552e5
MD5: 92b069ef1fd9a5d9c78a2d3682c16b8f
MD5: a494da11f47a853308bfdb3c0705f4e1
MD5: 9f38eff6c58667880d1ff9feb9093dcb
MD5: a8a3ac5f7639d82b24e9eb4f9ec5981c
MD5: 0ebc8e9f5ec72a0ff73a73d81dc6807d
MD5: a3cd8f8302a69e786425e51467ad5f7c
MD5: 38837c60e2d87991c6c754f8a6fb5c2d
MD5: 522a8efdc382b38e336d4735a73e6b23
MD5: 052abb9b41f07192e8a02f0746e80280
MD5: 712a1184c5fc1811192cba5cc7feda51
MD5: bdae8a51d4f12762b823e42aa6c3fa0a
MD5: aec4b95aa8d80ee9a57d11cb16ce75ba
MD5: 6b854f2171cca50f49d1ace2d454065a
MD5: 945279ce239d2370e4a65b4f109b533b
MD5: cde433d371228fb7310849c03792479e
MD5: 957265e799246225e078a6d65bde5717
MD5: cde433d371228fb7310849c03792479e
MD5: 1f1074b709736fe4504302cbc06fd0f6
MD5: 1cd241a5ea55eb25baf50af25629af27
MD5: 60d9a75b5d3320635f9e33fe76b9b836
MD5: e23f69eea5fa000f259e417b64210d42
MD5: 36503b8a9e2c39508a50eb0bdbb66370
MD5: 1f1074b709736fe4504302cbc06fd0f6
MD5: da13e08a8778fa4ea1d60e8b126e27be
MD5: 642495185b4b22d97869007fcbc0e00f
MD5: 9af5d82f330bbc03f35436b3cc2fba3a
MD5: 6099516a39abb73f9d7f99167157d957
MD5: 6c75b3e9bf4625dc1b754073a2d0c4f1
MD5: e23f69eea5fa000f259e417b64210d42
MD5: ffb37b431ed1f0ac5764b57fa8d4cced
MD5: 1cd241a5ea55eb25baf50af25629af27
MD5: b3055e852b47979a774575c09978981a
MD5: 9f38eff6c58667880d1ff9feb9093dcb
MD5: 945279ce239d2370e4a65b4f109b533b
MD5: 66a0bbebbe14939706093aa5831b53a7
MD5: 30a2797f33ecb66524e01a63e49485dd
MD5: 785e921ea686c2fc8514fac94dd8a9cd
MD5: 69a68bdcbad227d5d8d1a27dd9c30ce7
MD5: f246b101bc66fe36448d0987a36c3e0a
MD5: 4fd086a236c2f3c70b7aa869fa73f762
MD5: 642495185b4b22d97869007fcbc0e00f
MD5: fd8b784df4bbb8082a7534841aa02f0e
MD5: 3ee70d31d0a3b6fab562c51d8ff70e6d
MD5: 3381d21f476d123dcf3b5cbc27b22ae1
MD5: 006b32148ce6747fddb6d89e5725573e
MD5: 7a4639488b4698f131e42de56ceeb45d
MD5: b9667e23bd400edcafde58b61ac05f96
MD5: 12527fd41dd6b172f8e28049011ebd05
MD5: c9baecb122bb6d58f765aaca800724d2
MD5: 799531e06e6aa19d569595d32d16f7cc
MD5: e301c2135724db49f4dd5210151e8ae9
MD5: 29d7c73bd737d5bb48f272468a98d673

In 2013, we can easily differentiate between the botnet building type of two-factor authentication bypassing mobile trojans, and the ubiquitous for the market segment, subscription based premium rate SMS malware, relying on deceptive advertising and successful 'visual social engineering' campaigns. The second, continue getting largely monetized through one of the primary growth factors of the mobile market segment, namely, affiliate networks for mobile malware.

In this post, I'll profile what can be best described as a sophisticated, customer-ized, customization and efficiency oriented, API-supporting, DIY mobile "lab" for generating, managing and operating multi-mobile-operating systems type of mobile malware campaigns. The service's unique value proposition (UVP) in comparison to that of competing "labs" for managing, operating and converting mobile traffic -- acquisition and selling of mobile traffic is a commoditized underground market item in 2013 -- orbits around the feature rich interface, offering 100% customization, monitoring and generally operating the campaigns, while efficiently earning fraudulently obtained revenue from unsuspecting mobile device users.

Sample screenshots featuring the administration panel of an affiliate network participant:













Sample "system" domains used for hosting/rotating the generated mobile malware samples courtesy of the service:
jmobi.net - 91.202.63.75
omoby.net - 91.202.63.75
rrmobi.net - 91.202.63.75
moby-aa.ru - 91.202.63.75
mobyc.net - 91.202.63.75
mobi-files.com - 91.202.63.75
mobyw.net - 91.202.63.75
mobyy.net - 91.202.63.75
mobyc.net - 91.202.63.75
mobyz.net - 91.202.63.75

Known to have responsed to the same IP are also the following malicious domains:
doklameno1.ru
doklameno2.ru
downloadakpinstall.ru
mobiy.net
moby-aa.ru
moby-ae.ru
mobyc.net
mobyw.com
mobyw.net
mobyy.net
mobyz.net
omoby.net
rrmobi.net
system-update.ru
telefontown.pp.ua

Sample Web sites serving multi-mobile-operating-system premium rate mobile malware, relying on the service:



Samples generated and currently distributed in the wild using the service:
MD5: ac69514f9632539f9e8ad7b944556ed8 - detected by 15 out of 48 antivirus scanners as HEUR:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Stealer.a
MD5: e62f97a095ca15747bb529ee9f1b5057 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 0688dac2754cce01183655bbbe50a0b1 - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 4062a77bda6adf6094f4ab209c71b801 - detected by 2 out of 44 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 42a6cf362dbff4fd1b5aa9e82c5b7b56 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 3bcbe78a2fa8c050ee52675d9ec931ad - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 53d3d35cf896938e897de002db6ffc68 - detected by 2 out of 47 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 2f66735b37738017385cc2fb56c21357 - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 0ec11bba4a6a86eb5171ecad89d78d05 - detected by 2 out of 47 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 9f059c973637f105271d345a95787a5f - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: f179a067580014b1e16900b90d90a872 - detected by 2 out of 47 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: aef4f659943cbc530e4e1b601e75b19e - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 8a00786ed6939a8ece2765d503c97ff8 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 868fcf05827c092fa1939930c2f50016 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: a6ef49789845ed1a66f94fd7cc089e1b - detected by 2 out of 47 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 22aa473772b2dfb0f019dac3b8749bb6 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 52b74046d0c123772566d591524b3bf7 - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: bbff61a2e3555a6675bc77621be19a73 - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX

Cybercrime-friendly affiliate networks continue, and will continue to represent a major driving factor behind the growth of any market segment within the cybercrime system, as they result in a win-win-lose scenario for their operations, participants and the potential victims of the fraudulent/malicious propositions/releases courtesy of these networks. With mobile traffic acquisition available on demand based on any given preference a potential could have, cybercriminals would continue converting it into victims, cashing in on their overall lack of awareness of the TTPs of today's modern cybercriminals.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Monday, November 04, 2013

Malicious Script Artifacts at China Green Dot Gov Dot Cn - A Reminiscence of Asprox's Multi-Tasking Activities


Malware artifacts, abandoned mass iframe embedded/injected campaigns, and low Quality Assurance (QA) campaigns, continue popping up on everyone's radar, raising eyebrows as to the extend of incompetence, possible evasive tactics, plain simple lack of applied QA when maintaining these campaigns, or the end of a campaign's life cycle.

What's the value of assessing such a non-active campaign? Can the analysis provide any clues into related currently active malicious campaigns that typically for such type of campaigns, continue relying on the same malicious infrastructure? But of course.

Let's assess the malicious artifacts at hxxp://chinagreen.gov.cn, connect them to the multi-tasking activities conducted on behalf of the Asprox botnet, as well as several spamvertised malware campaigns circa 2010, and most importantly provide actionable intelligence on currently active campaigns that continue using the very same infrastructure for command and control purposes.

Malicious scripts at China Green Dot Gov Dot CN:
update.webserviceftp.ru/js.js - seen in "Dissecting the Xerox WorkCentre Pro Scanned Document Themed Campaign"
gdi.webserviceftp.ru/js.js - seen in "Dissecting the Xerox WorkCentre Pro Scanned Document Themed Campaign"
ver.webserivcekota.ru/js.js - seen in "Dissecting the Xerox WorkCentre Pro Scanned Document Themed Campaign"
batch.webserviceaan.ru/js.js - seen in "Dissecting the Xerox WorkCentre Pro Scanned Document Themed Campaign"
nemohuildiin.ru/tds/go.php?sid=1 - seen in "Dissecting the Xerox WorkCentre Pro Scanned Document Themed Campaign"
parkperson.ru:8080/index.php?pid=13 - seen in "Spamvertised Best Buy, Macy's, Evite and Target Themed Scareware/Exploits Serving Campaign"
nutcountry.ru:8080/index.php?pid=13 - seen in "Spamvertised Best Buy, Macy's, Evite and Target Themed Scareware/Exploits Serving Campaign"

What's so special about the spamvertised XeroxWorkCentre Pro campaign is that, back in 2010, it used to drop an Asprox sample, naturally phoning back to well known Asprox C&Cs at the time.

nemohuildiin.ru is known to have responded to 31.31.204.61 and most recently to 5.63.152.19

Known to have responded to the same IP (31.31.204.61) are also the following malicious domains:
000sstd.com
02143.ru
03111991.ru
0414.ru
0424.ru
050175.ru
054ru.ru
06140.ru
0664346910.ru
0801.ru
08108.ru
087474.ru
08755.ru
0925.ru
0go.ru
1-androds.ru
10000taxi.ru
1001domains.ru
100yss.ru
124k.ru

Moreover, we also got a decent number of malicious MD5s known to have used the same IP as C&C ove the last couple of months, indicating that the artifact is still part of the C&C infrastructure of active campaigns.

The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to the same IP over the last couple of months:
MD5: 3e3d249c43950ac8bedb937f1ea347f5
MD5: 398b5f0c4b8f9adb1db8420801b52562
MD5: 9a1602a2693ae510339ef5f0d25be0b3
MD5: 9bc423773de47d95de1718173ec8485f
MD5: 637db36286b3e300c37e99a0b4772548
MD5: 9829c64613909fbb13fc402f23baff1b
MD5: f23562bafd94f7b836633f1fb7f9e18f
MD5: 7d263c93829447b2399c2e981d66c9df
MD5: 6ee37ead84906711cb2eed6d7f2fcc88
MD5: 54eb099176e7d65817d1b9789845ee4e
MD5: 723618efbd0d3627da09a770e5fd28c2
MD5: 151030c819209af9b7b2ecf2f5c31aa0
MD5: 279d390b9116f0f8ac80321e5fa43453
MD5: f78ff547ce388a403f5ba979025cd556
MD5: afa7090479ac49a3547931fe249c52e3
MD5: a2565684ae4c0af5a99214da83664927
MD5: ce4f032a3e478f4d4cac959b2e999b5a

Known to have responded to 5.63.152.19 are also the following malicious domains:
6tn.ru
azosi.ru
bi-news.ru
buygroup.ru
dnpsirius.ru
enterplus.ru
nemohuildiin.ru
nfs-worlds.ru
rassylka-na-doski.ru
santehnikaoptom.ru
v-odnoklassniki.ru

In a cybercrime ecosystem dominated by leaked DIY mass Web site hacking tools, and sophisticated iframe-ing platforms, malicious artifacts are a great reminder that as long as the Web site remains susceptible to remote exploitation, it's only a matter of time before a potential cybercriminal embeds/injects malicious script on it. That's cybercrime-friendly common sense.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Tuesday, October 01, 2013

Fake Pinterest 'Don't forget to confirm your email!' Themed Emails Serve Client-side Exploits and Malware

Cybercriminals have just launched yet another massive spam campaign, this time attempting to trick Pinterest users into thinking that they've received an email confirmation request. In reality though, once users click on the links found in the malicious emails, they're automatically exposed to client-side exploits, with the campaign dropping two malware samples on the affected hosts once a successful client-side exploitation takes place.

Let's dissect the campaign, expose the malicious portfolio of domains involved in it, provide MD5s of the served malware as well as a sample exploit, and provide actionable (historical) intelligence regarding related malicious activities that have been taking place using same infrastructure that's involved in the Pinterest campaign.

Spamvertised malicious URL: 
boxenteam.com/hathaway/index.html?emailmpss/PSEUDO_RANDOM_CHARACTERS

Attempts to load the following malicious scripts:
theodoxos.gr/hairstyles/defiling.js
web29.webbox11.server-home.org/volleyballs/cloture.js
knopflos-combo.de/subdued/opposition.js


Sample client-side exploits serving URL:
pizzapluswindsor.ca/topic/latest-blog-news.php

Malicious domain name reconnaissance:
pizzapluswindsor.ca - 50.116.6.57; 174.140.169.145

Responding to the same IP (50.116.6.57) are also the following malicious domains part of the campaing's infrastructure:
pizzapluswindsor.ca
plainidea.com
procreature.com
poindextersonpatrol.com
pixieglitztutus.com

Known to have responded to the second IP (174.140.169.145) are also the following malicious domains:
lesperancerenovations.com
louievozza.com
louvozza.com
lv-contracting.com
lvconcordecontracting.com
mcbelectrical.ca
oliviagurun.com
onecable.ca
onlyidea.com
originalpizzaplus.ca
originalpizzaplus.com
papak.ca
pccreature.com
pixieglitztutus.com
pizzapluswindsor.ca
saltlakecityutahcommercialrealestate.com

The following malicious MD5s are known to have phoned back to the same IP on the 22nd of September, 2013:
MD5: 5d14ee5800fc3c73e4d40567044c4149
MD5: bdc2ac48921914f25d1a3a164266cebc
MD5: a0b2ba75ba7ad7ad5a5b87a966fddb07
MD5: 31c3eae608247c2901d64643d5626b1f
MD5: 3cff9bba085254f2a524207a1388b015
MD5: b59743a3b128c9676548510627db4ac5
MD5: 53004bb63d32792c9bc1b8b26db0f197
MD5: b59743a3b128c9676548510627db4ac5
MD5: 53004bb63d32792c9bc1b8b26db0f197
MD5: 94e7cf26589baac1d47d6834e6375a62
MD5: 38461b4537fb269b2142e7fbac16375b
MD5: 041e9ccce8809371b07f0ac1c4d02b33
MD5: 868cf2c7af8863aebbaeb42c1b404b36
MD5: 7ec71f392dfc98336808ca6e31f25969
MD5: 6792b758ea961f58ad5b2f1eb96a648a
MD5: 33550cef428cad48ba776ea109fe1936
MD5: af84138bc55192ce722582def2f05200
MD5: 170524f3457d1fa681cc5dafbcc86199
MD5: e3af059e42b82b8658f3d05043a5a213
MD5: 4724783ae2c928b40dd2c0ac6d85cbc4
MD5: 9b8d87230ee7f553e8a9011a37ca699e
MD5: e4d63169ddac5e34fe000dc21c88682f
MD5: 5f777af07c79369310dff97d04c026cd
MD5: 200badc2e35ce57f1e511aea7322e207
MD5: 93fe170f26d99aea52b30b74afdf96bc
MD5: d06a0cc046e99496ada5591d9f457fc1
MD5: 6f857be5377a7543858aacefea6f1a30
MD5: 92ed463b3c38f2c951c3acd78e7a2df3
MD5: 8f01cd5ddd6e599e79ddcefbff9c0891

Detection rate for a sample served exploit from the Pinterest themed campaign: 
MD5: d49275523cae83a5e7639bb22604dd86 - detected by 5 out of 48 antivirus scanners as HEUR:Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.gen

Upon successful client-side exploitation, the campaign drops two malware samples on the affected hosts.

Detection rate for the first dropped sample: 
MD5: ae840d6ac2f02b4bff85182d2c72a053 - detected by 6 out of 48 antivirus scanners as UDS:DangerousObject.Multi.Generic

Once executed, it phones back to the following C&C:
78.140.131.151/uploading/id=REDACTED&u=PSEUDO_RANDOM_CHARACTERS

The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to the following C&C IP (78.140.131.151) in the past:
MD5: ca783e0964e7dcb91fcc2a2ff4b8058f
MD5: d02b0e60f94d718fca19893f13dbd93e
MD5: 3618032d05c12e6d25aa4b7bc9086e06
MD5: 20777b8e6362f8775060fc4fdb191978
MD5: 5a1fb639f5dd97b62b5cf79c84d479f6
MD5: 30f8d972566930c103f9edb7f9bd699e
MD5: 7011abeefd5c9e7c21e3cbe28cc5e71a
MD5: bbb57f1a5004b6adc016c0c9e92add19
MD5: cca6b7fae6678c4b17f21b2ed4580404
MD5: 0decc3f58519c587949dff871fccba5e
MD5: 1b18f9138adbd6b4bf7125c7e6a97aae
MD5: 1e4451c19f07ef6bde87ffbcecc5afb3
MD5: e92297e402fcd03f06c94fe52985a3e9
MD5: 818e329757630bccc9536151f533fad2
MD5: 79e8677f857531118e61fa9238287acb
MD5: de8ef966e7e5251b642540e715d673a6
MD5: 9be83dc4b829ffba26029b173b36237d
MD5: c9b3f7888faa393ee14815494a311684
MD5: d90058b75b8730f9d6bf94a845b3dfda
MD5: e14b4290eec92ce6cd3e0349c17bc062
MD5: 6d5f5419f6a116f4283ae58516ff90a1
MD5: d0587b6e83a70798077e2938af66c50c
MD5: 12449febf7efed7bceade5720c8f635d
MD5: 992fc7370b39553ebcb3c03c23c15517
MD5: 1c198a6b80b1dcf280db30133c26d479
MD5: 7bb85f458b6b8a0bc98d47447b44c5b6
MD5: 1a3679c0c7c42781d9ee5b6987efa726
MD5: 7d21915fc425b3545c8e156116f91e00

Detection rate for the second dropped sample:
MD5: 83bbe52c8584a5dab07a11ecc5aaf090 - detected by 3 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.qgje; Trojan.Backdoor.RV

Once executed it starts listening on ports 7867 and 1653.

The sample then creates the following Mutexes on the affected hosts:
Local\{B0B9FAFD-CA9C-4B54-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{B0B9FAFC-CA9D-4B54-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{D15F4CEE-7C8F-2AB2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{D15F4CE9-7C88-2AB2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{0BB5ADEF-9D8E-F058-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{911F9FCD-AFAC-6AF2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{2E06BA86-8AE7-D5EB-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{B0B9FAFD-CA9C-4B54-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{B0B9FAFC-CA9D-4B54-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{D15F4CEE-7C8F-2AB2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{D15F4CE9-7C88-2AB2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{0BB5ADEF-9D8E-F058-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{BB67AFC4-9FA5-408A-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-11EB-B06D3016937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-75EA-B06D5417937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-4DE9-B06D6C14937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-65E9-B06D4414937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-89E9-B06DA814937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-BDE9-B06D9C14937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-51E8-B06D7015937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-81E8-B06DA015937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-FDE8-B06DDC15937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-0DEF-B06D2C12937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-5DEF-B06D7C12937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-95EE-B06DB413937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-F1EE-B06DD013937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-89EB-B06DA816937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-F9EF-B06DD812937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-E5EF-B06DC412937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-0DEE-B06D2C13937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-09ED-B06D2810937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-51EF-B06D7012937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-35EC-B06D1411937F}
Global\{EFF344E9-7488-141E-55EF-B06D7412937F}
Global\{DDB39BDC-ABBD-265E-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{2E1C200D-106C-D5F1-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
MPSWabDataAccessMutex
MPSWABOlkStoreNotifyMutex

Once executed, it also drops MD5: 2da7bbc5677313c2876b571b39edc7cf and MD5: 83bbe52c8584a5dab07a11ecc5aaf090 on the affected hosts.

It then phones back to the following C&C (command and control servers):
99.157.164.179
174.76.94.24
99.60.68.114
217.35.75.232
184.145.205.63
99.60.111.51
207.47.212.146
108.240.232.212
107.193.222.108

We've already seen (some of) these C&C IPs in the following profiled malicious campaign "Spamvertised Facebook 'You have friend suggestions, friend requests and photo tags' Themed Emails Lead to Client-side Exploits and Malware".

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Saturday, September 28, 2013

Spamvertised Facebook 'You have friend suggestions, friend requests and photo tags' Themed Emails Lead to Client-side Exploits and Malware


A currently circulating malicious 'Facebook notifications" themed spam campaign, attempts to trick Facebook's users into thinking that they've received a notifications digest for the activity that (presumably) took place while they were logged out of Facebook. In reality though, once users click on any of the links found in the malicious email, they're automatically exposed to client-side exploits ultimately dropping malware on their hosts.

Let's dissect the campaign, provide actionable intelligence on the campaign's structure, the involved portfolio of malicious domains, actual/related MD5s, and as always, connect the currently ongoing campaign with two other previously profiled malicious campaigns.

Spamvertised URL:
hxxp://user4634.vs.easily.co.uk/darkened/PSEUDO_RANDOM_CHARACTERS

Attempts to load the following malicious scripts:
hxxp://3dbrandscapes.com/starker/manipulator.js
hxxp://distrigold.eu/compounding/melisa.js
hxxp://ly-ra.com/shallot/mandalay.js

Client-side exploits serving URL:
hxxp://directgrid.org/topic/lairtg-nilles-slliks.php

Malicious domain name reconnaissance:
directgrid.org - 50.116.10.71 - Email: ringfields@islandresearch.net

Responding to the following IP (50.116.10.71) are also the following malicious domains participating in the campaign:
directgrid.biz
directgrid.com
directgrid.info
directgrid.net
directgrid.org
directgrid.us
gilkjones.com
integra-inspection.ca
integra-inspection.co
integra-inspection.info
taxipunjab.com
taxisamritsar.com
watttrack.com

The following malicious MD5s are known to have been downloaded -- related campaigns -- from the same IP (50.116.10.71):
MD5: 7eb6740ed6935da49614d95a43146dea
MD5: 7768f7039988236165cdd5879934cc5d

The following malicious MD5s are known to have 'phoned back' to the same IP (50.116.10.71) over the past 24 hours:
MD5: a0065f7649db9a885acd34301ae863b0
MD5: 5503573f4fe15b211956f67c66e18d02
MD5: 01d757b672673df8032abbaa8acf3e22
MD5: 7ad68895e5ec9d4f53fc9958c70df01a
MD5: fd99250ecb845a455499db8df1780807
MD5: fd99250ecb845a455499db8df1780807
MD5: 3983170d46a130f23471340a47888c93
MD5: c86c79d9fee925a690a4b0307d7f2329
MD5: 25f498f7823f12294c685e9bc79376d2
MD5: 470f4aa3f76ea3b465741a73ce6c22fe
MD5: 43b78852a7363d8a4cf7538d4e68c887
MD5: e3aae430ed4036b19f26fa2ed9bbe2bf
MD5: e782619301a0a0a843cedc5d02c563b5
MD5: fc16335d0e1827b271b031309634dc0f
MD5: a55e21b0231d0508cb638892b6ee8ec5
MD5: 053c84c12900b81506eb884ec9f930c9
MD5: e03d0dd786b038c570dc53690db0673b
MD5: 086b16af34857cb5dfb0163cc1c92569
MD5: e066b50bae491587574603bdfd60826e
MD5: eb22137880f8c5a03c73135f288afb8a
MD5: b88392fb63747668c982b6321e5ce712
MD5: 6254d901b1566bef94e673f833adff8c
MD5: 258d640b802a0bbe08471f4f064cb94a
MD5: c1cefb742107516c3a73489eae176745
MD5: a19f1d5c98c2d7f036f2693ad6c14626
MD5: 3f02f35bc73ad9ef14ab4f960926fd45

Sample detection rate for the client-side exploits serving malicious script:
MD5: 00f5d150ff1b50c0bbc1d038eb676c29 - detected by 2 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Script.Exploit.Kit.C; Troj/ObfJS-EO


Sample detection rate for the served exploit:
MD5: d49275523cae83a5e7639bb22604dd86 - detected by 5 out of 48 antivirus scanners as HEUR:Exploit.Java.Generic; HEUR_JAVA.EXEC; TROJ_GEN.F47V0927

Upon successful client-side exploitation the campaign drops the following malicious sample on the affected hosts:
MD5: 6ef9476e6227ef631b231b66d7a2a08b - detected by 7 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Win32/Spy.Zbot.AAU; Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.qckm; TROJ_GEN.F47V0927

Once executed, the sample starts listening on ports 3185 and 7101.

It also creates the following Mutexes on the system:
Local\{B0B9FAFD-CA9C-4B54-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{B0B9FAFC-CA9D-4B54-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{D15F4CEE-7C8F-2AB2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{D15F4CE9-7C88-2AB2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{0BB5ADEF-9D8E-F058-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Local\{911F9FCD-AFAC-6AF2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{2E06BA86-8AE7-D5EB-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{B0B9FAFD-CA9C-4B54-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{B0B9FAFC-CA9D-4B54-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{D15F4CEE-7C8F-2AB2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{D15F4CE9-7C88-2AB2-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{0BB5ADEF-9D8E-F058-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{BB67AFC4-9FA5-408A-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-11EB-B06D3016937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-75EA-B06D5417937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-4DE9-B06D6C14937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-65E9-B06D4414937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-89E9-B06DA814937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-BDE9-B06D9C14937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-51E8-B06D7015937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-81E8-B06DA015937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-FDE8-B06DDC15937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-0DEF-B06D2C12937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-5DEF-B06D7C12937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-95EE-B06DB413937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-F1EE-B06DD013937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-89EB-B06DA816937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-F9EF-B06DD812937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-E5EF-B06DC412937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-0DEE-B06D2C13937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-09ED-B06D2810937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-51EF-B06D7012937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-35EC-B06D1411937F}
Global\{3DC7903B-A05A-C62A-55EF-B06D7412937F}
Global\{DDB39BDC-ABBD-265E-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
Global\{2E1C200D-106C-D5F1-DBC9-BE58FA349D4A}
MPSWabDataAccessMutex
MPSWABOlkStoreNotifyMutex


The following Registry Keys:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Waosumag

And changes the following Registry Values:

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Identities] -> Identity Login = 0x00098053
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] -> Keby = ""%AppData%\Ortuet\keby.exe""
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Waosumag] -> 2df3e6ig = 23 CD 87 C3 1E D1 FA C6 28 2E DF 4D 12 21; 2icbbj3a = 0xC3E6CD13; 185cafc2 = CB D5 E6 C3 F6 D8 CD C6 05 2E EF 4D


It then phones back to the following C&C (command and control) servers:
99.157.164.179
174.76.94.24
99.60.68.114
217.35.75.232
184.145.205.63
99.60.111.51
207.47.212.146
108.240.232.212
107.193.222.108
173.202.183.58
201.170.83.92
81.136.188.57
71.186.174.184


We've already seen the same IPs (217.35.75.232; 108.240.232.212) in the following previously profiled malicious campaign - Spamvertised “FDIC: Your business account” themed emails serve client-side exploits and malware.

We've also seen (107.193.222.108) in the following malicious campaign - Spamvertised ‘Export License/Invoice Copy’ themed emails lead to malware, indicating that all of these campaigns are controlled using the same malicious botnet infrastructure.

The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to the same C&C servers used in this campaign, over the past 24 hours:
MD5: 9f550edbb505e22b0203e766bd1b9982
MD5: 46cdaead83d9e3de803125e45ca88894
MD5: ffe07e0997d8ec82feb81bac53838d6d
MD5: 28c0bc772aec891a08b06a4029230626
MD5: c8055c6668d1c4c9cb9d68c2c09c14d4
MD5: 0bbabb722e1327cbe903ab477716ae2e
MD5: c4c5db70e7c971e3e556eb9d65f87c84
MD5: 0ff4d450ce9b1eaaef5ed9a5a1fa392d
MD5: e01f435a8c5ed93f6800971505a2cdd2
MD5: 042508083351b79f01a4d7b7e8e35826
MD5: 1f5f75ae82d6aa7099315bf19d0ae4e0
MD5: 35c4d4c2031157645bb3a1e4e709edeb
MD5: a0065f7649db9a885acd34301ae863b0
MD5: 5503573f4fe15b211956f67c66e18d02
MD5: 01d757b672673df8032abbaa8acf3e22
MD5: fd99250ecb845a455499db8df1780807
MD5: 1fab971283479b017dfb79857ecd343b
MD5: a130cddd61dad9188b9b89451a58af28
MD5: 2af94e79f9b9ee26032ca863a86843be
MD5: 8b03a5cf4f149ac7696d108bff586cc5
MD5: 802a522405076d7f8b944b781e4fe133
MD5: b9c7d2466a689365ebb8f6f607cd3368
MD5: 43b78852a7363d8a4cf7538d4e68c887
MD5: c62b6206e9eefe75ba1804788dc552f7
MD5: 385b5358f6a1f15706b536a9dc5b1590
MD5: e3aae430ed4036b19f26fa2ed9bbe2bf
MD5: e782619301a0a0a843cedc5d02c563b5
MD5: fc16335d0e1827b271b031309634dc0f
MD5: 4850969b7febc82c8b82296fa129e818
MD5: 203e0acced8a76560312b452d70ff1e7
MD5: a55e21b0231d0508cb638892b6ee8ec5
MD5: edb1a26ebb8ab5df780b643ad1f0d50f
MD5: 053c84c12900b81506eb884ec9f930c9
MD5: e03d0dd786b038c570dc53690db0673b
MD5: 47d4804fda31b6f88b0d33b86fc681ae
MD5: 086b16af34857cb5dfb0163cc1c92569

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Dissecting FireEye's Career Web Site Compromise


Remember when back in 2010, I established a direct connection between several mass Wordpress blogs compromise campaigns, with the campaign behind the compromised Web site of the U.S. Treasury, prompting the cybercriminal(s) behind it to redirect all the campaign traffic to my Blogger profile?

It appears that the cybercriminal/gang of cybercriminals behind these mass Web site compromise campaigns is/are not just still in business, but also -- Long Tail of the malicious Web -- managed to infect FireEye' (external network) Careers Web Site.

Let's dissect the campaign, expose the malicious domains portfolio behind it, provide MD5s for a sample exploit, the dropped malware, and connect it to related malicious campaigns, all of which continue to share the same malicious infrastructure.

Sample redirection chain:
hxxp://vjs.zencdn.net/c/video.js -> hxxp://cdn.adsbarscipt.com/links/jump/ (198.7.59.235; 63.247.93.69; 69.39.238.28; 74.81.94.44) (IE) -> hxxp://cdn.adsbarscipt.com/links/flash/?updnew (CHROME) -> hxxp://209.239.127.185/591918d6c2e8ce3f53ed8b93fb0735cd/face-book.php

Detection rate for a sample malicious script found on the client-side exploits serving site:
MD5: 809f70b26e3a50fb9146ddfa8cf500be - detected by 1 out of 49 antivirus scanners as Trojan.Script.Heuristic-js.iacgm

Sample detection rate for the served client-side exploit:
MD5: 71c92ebc2a889d3541ff6f20b4740868 - detected by 4 out of 49 antivirus scanners as HEUR:Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.gen; HEUR_JAVA.EXEC

Detection rate for a sample dropped malware:
MD5: 4bfb3379a2814f5eb67345d43bce3091 - detected by 15 out of 49 antivirus scanners as Trojan-PSW.Win32.Fareit.acqv; PWS:Win32/Fareit.gen!C

The following malicious MD5s are known to have been downloaded from the same IPs (cdn.adsbarscipt.com (198.7.59.235; 63.247.93.69; 69.39.238.28; 74.81.94.44):
MD5: 82e1013106736b74255586169a217d66
MD5: 01771c3500a5b1543f4fb43945337c7d
MD5: dbf6f5373f56f67e843af30fded5c7f2

Additionally, the campaign is also known to have dropped MD5: 01771c3500a5b1543f4fb43945337c7d

Once executed, the most recently dropped sample (MD5: 4bfb3379a2814f5eb67345d43bce3091) phones back to the following C&C servers:
main-firewalls.com (67.228.177.174; 74.204.171.69; 85.195.104.90) - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net
simple-cdn-node.com (109.120.143.109) - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net
akamai.com/gate.php

Deja vu! We've already seen alex1978a@bigmir.net in Network Solution's (2010) mass Wordpress blogs compromise, a campaign which is also directly connected with the compromise of the Web site of the U.S Treasury.

The sample also attempts to download the following additional malware variants:
main-firewalls.com/6.exe
main-firewalls.com/1.exe

simple-cdn-node.com/1.exe - MD5: 05d003a374a29c9c2bbc250dd5c56d7c

Responding to 67.228.177.174 are also the following malicious domains:
aodairangdong.com
bolsaminimall.com
catch-cdn.com
corp-firewall.com
himarkrealty.com
ngnetworld.com
ritz-entertainment.com
server.evietmusic.com
viettv24.com
vpoptv.com        
plussolarsolutions.com
artistflower.com
autoairsystems.com   
eighteas.com
greenpowersurvey.com
phattubi.com
ritz-entertainment.com
saigoncitymall.com


The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to the same IP (67.228.177.174) in the past:
MD5: 05636d38090e5726077cea54d2485806
MD5: 53b73675f1b08cf7ecfc3c80677c8d2e
MD5: 0f424ff9db97dafaba746f26d6d8d5c0
MD5: 633d6de861edc2ecf667f02d0997f10e
MD5: d13ead2b8a424b5e9c5977f8715514c4
MD5: bfc9803c94cc8ba76a916f8e915042e4
MD5: a04d33ced90f72c1a77f312708681c07
MD5: 7e6e15518cc48639612aa4ff00a2a454
MD5: 98d78ef8cc5aee193a7b7a3c3bb58c87
MD5: a030d6e35d736db9dd433a8d2ac8a915
MD5: 1f7a6ed70be6e13efb45e5ba80eed76e
MD5: cfc727a0ad51eb1f111305873d2ade04
MD5: 1b6de030ed3b42e939690630f63d6933
MD5: fa9e92d42580e1789ed04e551a379e4e
MD5: 2ed9d63e4d557667bad7806872cf4412
MD5: bef16d25b2cada2a388ea06c204b44f3
MD5: 77a93ba48d6532e069745bca117d26ed
MD5: 7c7e4cef8a7181f7982a841f7f752368
MD5: 57b5e6f38998e32fa93856970cc66c5e
MD5: 5d388b1f2bf2dc9493f5c4cfb9d53ca0
MD5: ec24a959e39c5d2eb7dc769f4b098efb
MD5: 6357085196499ef5301548ff17b62619
MD5: 3173d4be34f489a4630f2439f9653c2c
MD5: 3bd239ee46ab8ba02f57ed1762bd3ae6
MD5: dce3e33eb294f0a7688be5bea6b7e9d4
MD5: 1ed678e9d29c25043fdd1b4c44f5b2ea
MD5: eccce6f5f509f4ef986d426445a98f0d
MD5: 74e1e2f2d562ab6883124cfa43300cf2
MD5: 6922efa2e5aa16b78c982d633cbe44e9

Responding to 85.195.104.90 are also the following malicious domains:
catch-cdn.com
corp-firewall.com
kronoemail.com
main-firewalls.com
viacominfosys.com
emaildatastore.com


The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to the same IP (85.195.104.90) in the past:
MD5: 88110dbce9591b68b06b859e7965d509
MD5: 0e055888564fb59cb6d4e35a5c5fb33d
MD5: e9d8d2842b576fd4f6ef9dde1fea4b9f
MD5: e750031fc9b9264852133d8f7284ac7a
MD5: e0da2ca4e9a174cd3c6f8a348e4861ad
MD5: b23a579d7b8bf5a03c121d2f74234b2d
MD5: a1ee5246d984d900f27ce94fbfc37c2b
MD5: 2118a70a2ccf0a7772725e765ad64e08
MD5: f26848e64040b4b6614d95bd967045df
MD5: 9c5997b32bea6945f0cb9ff0c18cf040
MD5: 353305483087a5316fd75f63d641ec1f
MD5: 34e67771ca411b163866f1e795b2e72e
MD5: 571e04b5af915979efc5a7f77794facb
MD5: a21df3ee0c9dd87cf6ca66581aa7eb76
MD5: e2137edd5f550b1942c16e70095c436b
MD5: 97437f6d670db2596b6a6b53c887055c

Such type of factual attribution based on gathered historical OSINT, isn't surprising, thanks to the fact that despite the increasing number of novice cybercriminals joining the ecosystem, the "usual suspects" continue operating for the sake of achieving their fraudulent and malicious objectives.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.